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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
After World War II, and in particular during the 1960s and the 1970s, many 
developing countries began their industrial revolution path. In particular, most of 
them followed a path of government-led industrial development, with central 
planning at the heart of the industrial policy. Such a model is not new in economic 
history and it is typical of many ‘second-comers’ in the industrialization process. The 
most famous one is the case of Prussia/Germany: with the Zollverein (1833-34) and 
after the unification in 1870, it was the government which stimulated the development 
of a powerful heavy industrial system, following what was preached at the time by 
Friedrich List1. In particular, the key point of List preaching was that second-comers 
countries need to protect their industrialization process (characterized by infant 
industries) from foreign competition. According to List, once the protected industries 
reach an adequate competitive level, protection should be removed and the national 
companies should face competition in the market, in order to stimulate further 
technological development. Many second-comers countries embraced this model2; 
however, in most cases they failed to follow the second part of List’s 
recommendations: opening to the market in a second stage.   
Malaysia is for sure among the countries which used a massive political protection 
in order to develop national industries, in particular the automotive industry. 
Malaysian case is quite unique: instead of limiting the action in attracting foreign 
producers, government, under the leadership of Dr Mahathir, established a national 
                                                          
1 See List [1841] (1909). 
2 See in particular Gerschrenkon (1962). 
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brand through specific automotive policies: NCP and NAP. However, as we shall see, 
the results of such policies are contradictory.  
In section II. we will briefly draw a historical sketch about the evolution of the 
Malaysian automotive policy. In section III. the NAP 2014 will be presented. Section 
IV. is devoted in explaining, from a free market perspective, why tariffs and protection 
can be dangerous for a national economy. Finally, section V. will explain how NAP 
failure was predictable; if the modest result of Proton development is widely 
recognized, many studies failed to point out the right reason behind such failure: 
government central planning. Therefore, the future role for government intervention 
in industrial development will be analysed. Section VI. will try to show a possible way 
out for the government role and the Malaysian car industry.  
 
 
II. NCP AND NAP: A BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH 
 
Malaysia is one of the developing countries which, in the past decades, developed 
a defensive policy in order to give birth to a local automotive industry. It was in 
particular during the 1960s and the 1970s that many developing countries established 
automotive assembly industries in the realm of the so-called import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI) programmes3; with such programmes, they aimed to attract 
foreign direct investment and to protect the emergence of local industries4. 
Automotive was and is one of the favourite industries in which such protective 
schemes were implemented and the legacy of such protective policies still affects the 
industry5. In fact, before the mid-1960s Malaysian policy was characterized by a 
certain free market orientation and a regular plan of to support local industries was 
implemented only after pressures from the World Bank in 19636. 
As other countries, Malaysia developed such policy through LCRs (local content 
regulations) and tariff protection. But, as noted in Natsuda and Thoburn (2014, p. 
1353), the case for protectionist policies was not limited to economic motivations. On 
the contrary, «a key background was the policy designed to give ethnic Malaysia and 
other ‘indigenous’ people (collectively known as bumiputera) affirmative action 
preferences in relation to Malaysian ethnic Chinese and Indians and in relation to 
foreigners». 
Even if the political party known as UMNO (United Malays National 
Organization) has ruled Malaysia since independence in 1957, a key political moment 
                                                          
3 For a detailed description of Malaysian ISI policies see Rasiah (2011), pp. 150-156. See also Danaraj 
(2011), p. 399. 
4 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 113. 
5 Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 423. 
6 Rasiah (2011), p. 152. 
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in Malaysia history was represented by the race riots in 1969, risen after ethnic Chinese 
parties experienced an exploit7, winning more seats than expected8. In particular, the 
political situation brought out the trade-off between the politically powerful Malays 
majority and the economic power in Chinese hands9. It is after these riots that the New 
Economic Policy started to be implemented, aiming to reduce economical inter-
ethnical disparities and in particular with the sight to grow the economic position of 
bumiputra10. Main sight of the NEP was to achieve national unity eradicating poverty 
and increasing employment11, and government had immediately clear that to do so 
meant to support the Malay population. 
 
The New Economic Policy initiated in 1970 following the riots was designed explicitly to 
redress the economic balance in favour of bumiputra; in the 1980s it became the driving force of the 
country’s national car policy under its aggressively nationalist and longest-serving fourth Prime 
Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamed (1981-2003)12.  
 
Regarding the specific situation of the automotive industry, the New Economic 
Policy came after a series of protection schemes was already introduced in order to 
develop a national car industry: the import licence scheme (1966) and the 
Manufacturing License (1967)13. Thanks to such protection, from 1970 to the early 
1980s, the total production of vehicles grew from 28,000 to 100,000 units14.  
The protection policy became more aggressive during the 1980s, when the 
regulation on the so-called local contents were introduced, together with a stronger 
intervention in order to enhance bumiputra participation in heavy industries15. It is in 
the 1980s, in fact, that the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) focused on the process of 
heavy industrialization16. The establishment of Proton was decided with the First 
Industrial Master Plan (1986-1995)17. With regard to car industry protection, foreign 
producers were required to manufacture specific components locally, rather than 
importing them; at the same time protection via tariff and investment incentives was 
                                                          
7 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1355. 
8 Lim (2011), p. 12. 
9 Lim (2011), p. 12. 
10 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 114. 
11 Lim (2011), p. 12. 
12 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1355. 
13 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1355. 
14 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 120. 
15 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 120. 
16 Lim (2011), p. 19. 
17 Danaraj (2011), p. 400. 
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raised in order to protect local component producers18. In 1982, in example, tariffs on 
CBU PVs were 90 to 200 per cent19.  
 
Table 1. Tariffs on CBU PVs (%). 
 Before 
1997, Oct 
1997 
Oct 
2004  
Jan 
2005 
Jan 
2005 
Oct 
2006 
Mar 
2010 
Jun 
Non-Asean / Less than 1,800cc 140 140 80 50 30 30 30 
Non-Asean / 1,800cc – 1,999cc 170 170 100 50 30 30 30 
Non-Asean / 2,000cc – 2,499cc  170 200 120 50 30 30 30 
Non-Asean / 2,500cc – 2,999cc 200 250 160 50 30 30 30 
Non-Asean / Over 3,000cc 200 300 200 50 30 30 30 
Asean / Less than 1,800cc - - 70 20 15 5 0 
Asean / 1,800cc – 1,999cc - - 90 20 15 5 0 
Asean / 2,000cc – 2,499cc - - 110 20 15 5 0 
Asean / 2,500cc – 2,999cc - - 150 20 15 5 0 
Asean / Over 3,000cc - - 190 20 15 5 0 
Source: Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 426. 
 
Through such policy, the local content in the automotive industry increased from 
8% in 1979 to 18% in 1982 and 30% in 198620. Finally, in 1991 the Malaysian government 
introduced the local Material Content Policy, aiming to reach 60% of local content for 
PVs of less than 1850cc and 45% for PVs of 1851-2850cc by 199621. 
However, what distinguishes Malaysia among the developing countries is the 
attempt not simply to grow as manufacturing hub for foreign producers; rather, under 
Mahathir direction, during the 1980s, Malaysia implemented a big effort to develop a 
national car manufacturer through the so-called National Car Project (NCP), 
introduced in 198222. Prime Minister ‘dream’ was to see Malaysian driving cars they 
had built themselves23; in a way, Mahathir was right in arguing that local 
manufacturing is a necessary step for a country which wishes to develop; being able 
to import foreign product or assembly them would be not enough24. 
 
In late October 1982, Mahathir Mohamad, the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia, announced 
that Proton would be established to produce the first national car, which would be named the Saga. 
This National Car Project aimed to accelerate Malaysia’s heavy industrialization and the 
development of supporting industries. The project was also expected to strengthen the economic 
position of the bumiputeras and secure their participation in supporting industries25.  
                                                          
18 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1356. 
19 Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 425. 
20 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1356. 
21 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1356. 
22 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 120. 
23 Mahathir (2011), p. 510. 
24 Mahathir (2011), p. 512. 
25 Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 424. 
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Therefore, the sight of the project was twofold: creating a car producer and, at the 
same time, «enhancing bumiputera participation in heavy industries»26. Proton was 
born in 1983 and Malaysian government invested RM 480 million to establish the first 
factory27; however, the company was not able to reach a profit until 198928. Perodua, 
the second Malaysian car producer, launched its first manufacturing plant in 199429; 
while the first remains a national flagship, with capital majority in local hands, the 
policy for Perodua was less aggressive and nowadays the control is still in Japanese 
hands30. Thanks to such protection, Proton and Perodua dominate the Malaysian 
automotive market. 
The creation of Proton via NCP became one of the strongest areas of government 
intervention in Malaysia. In fact, the national automotive industry was, and is, not 
only protected by tariffs and the system of local content, but also heavily subsidised: 
only between 1986 and 1994, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of 
Malaysia spent RM 22 million to support the bumiputera participation in companies 
producing high-technology components31. Bumiputera protection was implemented in 
particular through the Vendor Development Program: under this scheme, Proton had 
to buy several components from small and medium enterprises32 in which more than 
70% of equity was held by bumiputera and in which more than 55% of total employees 
were bumiputera33. 
In the following years, Proton and the NCP suffered several problems due to: 
- difficult relationships with the technological partner, Mitsubishi, which ended 
in a divorce; 
- the acquisition of Lotus with the consequent financial troubles; 
- the free-trade agreements signed in the WTO and South East Asia cooperation 
realms.  
In fact, starting in the 2000s, the automotive industry changed. The concentration 
process made the big players more important. Therefore many developing countries 
focused in attracting such big players into their territory and in becoming regional 
hubs for their production and export34. But Malaysia preferred since the beginning the 
                                                          
26 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1356. 
27 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 120. 
28 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 120. 
29 Mahathir (2011), p. 521. 
30 Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 424. 
31 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1356 and Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 120. 
32 It means with shareholders’ funds below RM 2.5 million. Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 
429. 
33 Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 429. 
34 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 113. 
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ambitious project to develop its own national brand35. The most evident sign of the 
troubles suffered by Proton is the fact that in 2005 it was overcome by Perodua in 
terms of number of cars sold36. Even the privatization attempted in the 1990s did not 
succeed and government had to purchase back 27.2% of the company from DRB-
HICOM though Petronas in 200037. 
Regarding, instead the obligations imposed by the WTO, Malaysia tried to gain 
time, moving forward the terms for removing tariffs38, and, above all, replacing a 
policy of direct intervention with new and more hidden means of protection.  
 
Although all the tariffs on CBU and CKD vehicles were reduced, the government introduced a 
new excise duty system to compensate for the revenue losses from the reduction of tariffs in 2004. 
Furthermore, in March 2006, the Malaysian government introduced the National Automotive 
Policy (NAP), which linked refunds of the excise duty to the level of local content ratio, enabling 
the Malaysian government to protect local national car producers that, in general, used locally 
made components of lower cost and quality than imported ones39.  
 
The replacement of the NCP with the NAP became necessary with the aim to 
restructure a suffering industry. Government looked at the possibility to facilitate 
integration of Proton into the global automotive GVC (2006) and started to emphasize 
the possibility to develop an environment-friendly strategy (2009)40. However, 
Malaysian government did not miss the occasion to introduce hidden forms of 
protection through the Industrial Linkage Programme (ILP) and the Industrial 
Adjustment Fund (IAF)41, still linked with the LC system42. Favourable treatment was 
introduced for national car assembly, together with other non-tariff barriers like 
import quotas43. In this way, Malaysia was able to avoid to violate WTO rules and in 
the same time to implement a system of advantages for the national automotive 
industry. Moreover, the AP system (1966) and the ML system (1967), which are not in 
line with WTO prescriptions, were never abolished44. At the same time, NAP 2006 and 
NAP 2009 found new ways to support and promote local vendors, a policy that WTO 
is strongly asking to withdraw45. Malaysian government, however, intends to 
                                                          
35 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 114. 
36 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 114. 
37 K.S. and Tan (2011), p. 353. 
38 LC requirements and the mandatory deletion programme were abolished in January 2004. Natsuda, 
Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 124. 
39 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1360. 
4040 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 125. 
41 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1360. 
42 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 126. 
43 Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 122 and 125. 
44 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1360. 
45 Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 432. 
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continue its support to Proton and the bumiputera support policy remains a central and 
hot topic of the political agenda also regarding automotive and, in general, industrial 
development policies. 
 
Politics has also been an important part of the affirmative action story. On the one hand, the 
bumiputera policy has aimed to achieve sustainable social stability by addressing Malay grievances. 
On the other hand, the continuation of the policy has been deeply involved in the maintenance of 
the ruling Barisan Nasional’s political power in the country and the legitimacy of its leading party, 
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) as a Malay party. The cessation of the Malay 
preferential policies will not happen without strong political determination on the part of the 
government […]. It is difficult to imagine that the BN government – returned to power in the May 
2013 election – will abolish the bumiputera policy in the foreseeable future […]. In this sense Proton 
has become an albatross around the necks of Dr Mahathir’s successors, who have had to deal with 
Proton’s weaknesses while at the same time retaining their legitimacy within UMNO. Furthermore, 
MITI insists that Malay special rights are guaranteed in the Constitution, and that the WTO and 
other organisations do not understand the backwardness of the Malays and their need for 
preferential policies46.  
 
However, even with such a massive protection and with heavy government 
investments, we can say that the Malaysian car industry is not bringing out the 
expected result. If it is true that Proton and Perodua in 2010 were producing 57.2% of 
the Malaysian car output in 2010, in 2012 Malaysia was still a net importer of vehicles47. 
Countries like Thailand, instead, focused in becoming a hub for international 
producer such as Toyota and results were satisfactory; Malaysian policy aiming to 
develop a national car brand didn’t produce the same good results: Thailand attracted, 
in the period 2005-2010, 20 times more FDI than Malaysia48.  
Bad performances reflected in general on the industry. Due to the protection of the 
LC requirements, local suppliers of parts, mainly serving Proton, still do not meet 
international standards49. In particular, Malay preferential policies have in a way 
impeded further steps toward higher value-added activities50.  
In general, automotive protection failed to stimulate (or even blocked) 
technological development and failed to meet market demand. As we shall see later, 
such as a result was to be expected. 
 
 
III. NAP 2014: A SUMMARY 
 
                                                          
46 Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), pp. 436-437. 
47 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1362. 
48 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1364. 
49 Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 1364. 
50 Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 425. 
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NAP 2014 does not appear as a radical revolution compared with what was 
implemented under NAP 2006 and its 2009 review. The most important news appear 
to be the focus on «green initiatives, development of technology and human capital 
[…] and enhancement of the automotive industry ecosystem»51. With NAP 2014 
government focus is shifting from the development and defence of the local car 
manufacturing toward the possibility for Malaysia to become «regional hub in Energy 
Efficient Vehicle (EEV)»52. 
With NAP 2014, then, government plans to spend more in technological and 
environmental-oriented policies. However, it seems that the way to support such 
initiatives is not new: MLs for EEV category and customized incentives53. Moreover, 
is the government in itself that assumes the burden to provide relevant 
infrastructure54. All the future action is planned to be sustained with favourable loans 
and tax support.  
The most interesting part, however, is the support for developing human capital, 
in order to enhance the local technological growth. Still, it will be the government 
taking care of the training programs necessary to enhance technicians quality. 
Moreover, government plans to spend RM 75 million to further support the growth 
of bumiputera presence in the automotive industry55. What looks really impressive is 
the claim that the «NAP 2014 will include measures to create globally competitive 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs»56.  
The last sentence confirms us in the belief that nothing is radically changing with 
NAP 2014. We can see a shift in the focus from the manufacturing side to the 
environment and technological perspectives. However, everything strongly remains 
linked with the big and visible of government action. No opening to the market is 
appearing. Market expectations are supposed to be known by the central planner: 
government assumes, in example, that a Malaysian hub for EEV is what the Asian 
automotive market actually needs and asks for. Government is assuming that 
specialized technicians are what the labour market actually wants. The pretence of 
knowledge is high. Even, government is aiming to create competitive entrepreneurs. 
But is government mission to create entrepreneurs? And can actually and practically 
a centrally planned action develop entrepreneurship in a country? The next two 
sections will deal with the effects of a government-led development and the 
impossibility for it to bring out satisfactory results. 
 
                                                          
51 MITI (2014), point 4. 
52 MITI (2014), point 5.ii.  
53 MITI (2014), point 24. 
54 MITI (2014), point 27.iv.  
55 MITI (2014), point 49.ii. 
56 MITI (2014), point 48. 
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IV. WHAT DID GO WRONG? ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS 
AGAINST GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL PROTECTION 
 
The usual motivation behind the choice to protect the birth and development of a 
new industry in every country is quite straightforward: the new industry is strategic 
for the country development; the new industry could bring out new employment; 
being not yet adequately developed, it would need protection against external 
competition. Protection is thus presented as the necessary step in order to protect an 
industry who could develop the country and create new jobs. And in such a context, 
setting up «a motor industry is often seen as a crucial stage in industrialisation»57.  
Let us have a deeper look into such straightforward argument with a practical 
example. Suppose58 that the average cost to import a foreign vehicle on the Malaysian 
market is 100. If an emergent industry requires tariffs, it means that, at the present 
status of the industry technology in that country, it would not be possible to produce 
vehicles at a competitive price. In our example, if Malaysian automotive industry 
requires to be protected, it means that, given its technology and productivity, it is not 
able to produce cars spending less than 100. Therefore, in order to allow automotive 
industry to come into existence, Government will be forced to make imported vehicles 
more expensive. Suppose that production cost for Malaysian cars is 120. In order to 
make Malaysian cars attractive, Government should impose a duty able to: cover the 
Malaysian production cost, allow a profit for the producer and cut off the feeling that 
foreign cars are better and therefore it is worth to pay more money for them. A duty 
of 30 on foreign cars would not be enough in order to cover the three points. Most 
likely an adequate duty should be 8059. At the given technology and productivity of 
Malaysian automotive industry, situation can be summarized as follows: 
1. In case of free market (free of duties): 
a. Malaysians could have foreign cars at 100. 
b. Malaysian automotive industry would not arise unless a better 
technology and productivity would emerge. 
c. Improvement of technology and productivity would be stimulated, in 
order to force the country to compete with foreign products.  
2. In case of import duties: 
a. Malaysian could have foreign cars at 180. 
                                                          
57 Segawa, Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), p. 422. 
58 The example is modelled on Hazlitt [1946] (2012), pp. 58-59. 
59 The estimation in our example is not exaggerate. In fact, as reported in in Natsuda, Segawa and 
Thoburn (2013, p. 121), the «effective rate of protection (that is, protection on value-added) for the 
Malaysian transport and equipment sector as a whole was 252% in 1987, a very high figure, which 
probably had been reduced to about 140% for the least protected vehicles by 2011». 
10 | P a g e  
 
b. Malaysian could have local cars at 140 (production cost plus profit). 
c. Technology and productivity would have no incentive to be improved, 
given the fact that local cars are more convenient in price. Indeed, as 
argued in Natsuda and Thoburn (2014, pp. 1358-1359), «Proton suffered 
from weak product development and marketing capacity»60. 
The simple example easily demonstrates how tariffs create, at a first glance, two 
direct bad effects: 1. stop incentives for technological development and 2. increase 
price of products. Point 1. is easy to understand and does not need to be stressed. 
However, it would be interesting to reflect on the consequences of point 2. Even if, 
with tariffs, local cars would be cheaper than the imported ones, they are still more 
expensive than foreign vehicles in case of free market. What it is not always observed 
is that, de facto, introducing tariffs means to shift on people money the cost of industrial 
development. In fact, after tariffs, citizens would be forced to finance the cost of 
bringing the new industry into existence (40% in our example).  
Bad consequences are then spread on other industries. In fact, people will have to 
pay now 140 for what was paid before just 100. Indeed, we can say that citizens are 
financing the emergent industry. But this means also that if before people could spend 
100 for cars and 40 for other products, now they would have to spend 140 only for 
vehicles, being forced to cut their expenditures in other industries. Imposed tariffs 
therefore force people to cut their consumption: real incomes shrink not only because 
of the highest prices of cars, but also because the minor expenses devoted to other 
industries will force such industries to eventually cut their labour force.  
Everybody seems to be happy in watching a new industry arise and new jobs 
created. This fact is pretty evident. But such evidence hides the bad consequences of 
tariffs: increased prices, less money available for different consumptions (diminished 
real wages), unemployment spreading in other industries because of the shift in 
relative prices.  
Therefore, the relationship between industrial protection and employment is a 
fallacious one, as fallacious seemed, in the past, all the policies aiming to support 
employment61. Stimulating emergent industries means to modify the structure of 
relative prices, and as a result, many entrepreneurs will modify their production 
strategies. This change in production strategies will result in a change in the 
composition of the demand for capital goods of those entrepreneurs, and will also 
reduce the aggregate amount of money devoted to buying lower-order goods in the 
market. Therefore many entrepreneurs will stop buying goods from their usual 
                                                          
60 See also Natsuda, Segawa and Thoburn (2013), p. 114. 
61 Ferlito (2013), chapter 3. 
11 | P a g e  
 
suppliers. As a result, these suppliers will lose part of their markets and many will be 
forced to lay off workers or event to cease business62.  
This means that the change in the structure of relative prices, set in motion by 
support for national industries, triggers a disinvestment process that, weakening the 
consumption goods sector, generates unemployment.  
Moreover, it has to be argued that, introducing to people products at a price higher 
than the market one, central national industrial protection enhance an inflationary 
dynamics. Short term injections of money (industrial support) may well help maintain 
jobs at a higher level than would be possible otherwise; nonetheless, in the long term, 
the employment level resulting from these policies is destined to fall. 
While it is true that an increase in monetary incomes may increase employment, 
the basic mistake is to believe that implementing industrial government support may 
automatically generate employment. If spending is spread across the various sectors 
in a manner other than that in which employment is spread in the same sectors, then 
it cannot be assumed that an increase in spending has a positive effect on employment. 
The main outcome of inflationary forces and planning is to create a distortion in 
the system of resource allocation. A readjustment process is only possible where the 
free interaction of individuals allows the creation of information (discovery process) 
needed to catch mistakes and take a different path. 
When government support comes to an end, probably because inflation has 
reached an unsustainable level, demand will be forced to return in the direction 
expressed by the temporal preferences in existence prior to central intervention; 
inasmuch, employment created artificially in all probability will not be permanent. 
The new unemployment level may even be higher than the pre-stimulus situation, if 
monetary injections (subsidies and tariffs) have not only increased employment but 
have also stimulated the creation of new economic initiatives in the sectors so 
stimulated.  
There are other aspects to be mentioned as negative for the national economy. First 
of all, the cost for industrial protection. With the aim of developing ‘national interest’ 
governments are able to make the people to digest the burden for the protectionist 
policies. In fact, as we already have seen, the prospective of higher employment and 
national income (GDP) is the political argument to support every national industry, 
hiding the fact that the people will be burdened with higher prices products. 
 
Discussions on matters of economic growth have become a favourite pastime of our age. 
Among newspaper readers and television viewers all over the world, even among some 
economists, the notion that in this great age of ours it has become possible to sum up in one single 
figure the result of the economic activity of groups of individuals in countries, regions, or 
industries, appears to be accepted as a self-evident truth. Such figures are then used as a measure 
                                                          
62 See Ferlito (2013), p. 99 and Sanz Bas (2011), p. 298. 
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for comparisons over time and, with gusto, between countries. In many circles a low rate of growth 
of the gross national product has come to be regarded as a symptom of a social malaise63. 
 
In the above passage, Lachmann anticipated the present day critics toward GDP 
as a reliable instrument for measuring economic performances in a country and 
among countries64. However, the central point is «how it would have to be reached», 
while the «pattern of action required for the ‘path’ that leads towards it, is in general 
neglected»65. What (1973, p. 39) says can be interpreted in this way: neglecting how 
employment and GDP are generated means to hide the social cost created by 
implemented policies. Which is their cost? Who will pay for that?  
Such critics reveals a contradictory aspect of government plan for national 
industries defence: the microfoundations hidden behind the supposed 
macroeconomic development. Malaysian government heavily subsidised Proton, 
spending billions of RM. What people fail to realize is that the burden of those 
subsidies is directly shifted on rakyat shoulders. This happens in a double way: first 
through taxation. Money for subsidies has to come from somewhere and a higher 
taxation is the price that people pay (often praising at the same time the nationalistic 
economic policies because of their ideological appeal). Second, government can 
finance its development projects through further debt. This means a heavier fiscal 
burden for future generations66. It is enough to mention that Malaysian government 
spent RM 700 million for supporting the automotive industry in 2013 and RM 5 billion 
in 2012. In the first ten months of 2013 the amount reached RM 3 billion67. Who is 
paying for this? It seems people fails to see that the burden of such heavy investment 
is on their shoulder (if paid through taxes) or on the shoulder of future generations (if 
investments are financed by debt).  
In such a situation68, the government, issuing additional debt, increases the 
demand for loanable funds, making the interest rate to rise. This fact brings out two 
consequences: on one hand, the supply of loanable funds rises; on the other hand, we 
see a reduction in the demand for investment from private sector. But less investment 
means more consumption. This means that «with a reduced rate of investment, the 
economy grows at a slower rate, impinging negatively on the consumable output 
available in the future. To this extent, the debt burden is shifted forward»69, to the 
future generations.  
                                                          
63 Lachmann (1973), p. 36. 
64 Ferlito (2015), p. 18. 
65 Lachmann (1973), p. 39. 
66 Ferlito (2012b), pp. 111-113. 
67 MITI (2014), point 8. 
68 See Garrison (2001, p. 85). 
69 Garrison (2001), p. 87. 
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A larger deficit means lower taxes today on all taxpayers, shifting «some of the 
burden of current government spending onto future voters who are inadequately 
represented in today’s borrowing decisions». This means that, in such a way, a higher 
level of government spending becomes politically palatable70. Furthermore, as we can 
learn from the European crisis, borrowing can become an endless business, in 
particular if the debt is bought by Central Bank, that, monetizing it, creates 
distortions71. 
 Commenting the enormous American deficit, Garrison comes back on this topic, 
stressing that, at that level of borrowing, the 
 
effect of deficit will be: 
- higher interest rates (if the government borrows domestically); 
- increased inflation (if the Federal Reserve monetizes the debt); 
- weakened export markets (if the government sells debt abroad); 
- tax hikes […]; or  
- all the above in some combination72. 
 
It doesn’t matter where the resources for financing deficit come from. The situation 
is always negative. First of all, the government can borrow domestically73. In this case, 
Garrison (2001, p. 113) argues that, if individuals lend money to the government, then 
their saving is not available for private investment. Thus, demand for loanale funds 
that comes from government wins the competition against the firms. 
The second possible situation is that the government borrows from the central 
bank. This is the classical example for money creation. The typical result is that the 
«increased borrowing and spending put upward pressure on prices and wages», 
generating an inflationary process; the following adjustment brings out «inequities, 
perversities, and inefficiencies»74.  
The last possibility is that government borrows in world capital markets, from 
foreign savers and foreign central banks. This situation brings out a negative effect in 
real economy: deficit in international trade. In fact, ordinarily two countries exchange 
goods for goods. But, in this case foreign investors trade goods for Treasury bills, so 
the national industries are seriously damaged by such a politics75. 
The final and most important result of a protection policy is on the structure of 
production. In fact, through government intervention, the productive structure is not 
defined by economic actors preferences, tastes and expectations. On the contrary, it is 
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72 Garrison (2003), pp. 3-4. 
73 Garrison (2001), pp. 113-114. 
74 Garrison (2001), p. 114. 
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defined by government priorities and, in the best case, by what government assumes 
to be the good for the country. However, good intentions not necessarily meet reality. 
How can government implement and industrial plan which could actually meet 
market/consumer expectations? How can do this in the global market realm? 
Government, of course, lacks the necessary information content for a successful action 
and this is why its industrial effort is often frustrated. This problem will be analysed 
in detail in the next paragraph. 
 
  
V. AUTOMOTIVE GOVERNMENT PROTECTION:  
A FAILURE TO BE EXPECTED 
 
As we have seen, government protection worked as a break for technological 
development76. Not only, government action also failed to supply what desired by 
consumers in the market77. As we shall argue soon, the result is not surprising and it 
had to be expected. Before starting such analysis, however, it is necessary to stress that 
NCP and NAP not simply failed to create a competitive Malaysian car brand, but they, 
together with the NEP in general, also missed their second target: to implement the 
bumiputera entrepreneurial action in the realm of Malaysian industrial development. 
Such a failure is recognized, first and for all, by former Prime Minister Mahathir, who 
was a stronger supporter of the NEP. In recent interviews78, Dr M admitted that he 
tried, for 22 years, to change Malays mentality, but the result was a failure. Mahathir’s 
conclusion is that Malays are lazy and the NEP furtherly increased such laziness. Dr 
M’s delusion regarding the failure of the NEP towards bumiputera is clearly stated in 
his latest book. 
 
The Government provides them [the Malays] all kinds of support to help them acquire 
knowledge and skills. Unfortunately, they have developed a dependency on this support and 
demand that it be made permanent. What is the good of becoming an independent nation if 
internally as individuals and as a community we are always dependent on others? 
[…] 
I have discussed the New Economic Policy at length in these pages and how it has contributed 
much towards overcoming the gross economic disparities and social disadvantages between the 
races in Malaysia. But affirmative action cannot go on forever. I had hoped that much of the 
disparity would disappear through education, which is why we endured criticism of 
discrimination in the award of scholarships. But it is now nearly 40 years since the NEP was first 
implemented and we still have not achieved our target of making the Malays own 30 per cent of 
the country’s corporate wealth. The Government’s provision of enhanced access to university 
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education to Malays has seen a similar wasting of opportunities. To ask the non-Bumiputera to 
stand aside and wait while so many of the Bumiputera are happy to play around and not study is 
unfair.  
[…] 
Perhaps many Malay men like things that way, to be economically dependent upon and 
supported by their wives while they laze around in coffee shops or indulge in motorcycle stunts. 
[…] then they should not deny the right of others. Their attitude makes me worry about the Malay 
future79.  
 
«Where, I wonder, have we gone wrong?»80 is the laconic conclusion of Dr M, who 
adds: «What more do they [the Malays] expect to be done for them?»81. We stressed 
this aspect in order to remark how the automotive protection can be judged as a failure 
not only on the economic perspective but also from the racial point of view. 
Coming back to the economic perspective, we hinted that such a failure had to be 
expected. Why? In order to explain this it is necessary to explain why every kind of 
central planning is destined to be a failure82. We shall demonstrate that even without 
considering the a posteriori negative effects that State intervention may introduce into 
the system, every degree of planning is theoretically untenable a priori.  
The central question to be posed is whether rational economic calculation is 
possible in a centrally planned economic system (or in a specific industry). Such a 
question brings out another point: can the plan of a single man or institution (central 
planner) replace the free interaction of individuals in a complex society? We can start 
our analysis defining socialism as «any system of institutional aggression on the free 
exercise of human action or entrepreneurship»83. Human action is the core of economic 
analysis. In particular, human action deals with the ends-means framework chosen by 
individuals. Every economic agent is moved by expectations and preferences. 
Expectations and preferences generate desired ends. The content of information at 
disposal of each actor allows him to choose the supposed suitable means in order to 
reach the desired ends, consistently with expectations. The attempt to coordinate ends 
with means, in turn, generate action plans. Of course, plans are always consistent with 
the content of information at disposal of each individual at a certain moment in time. 
However, the setting in motion of plans put individuals in relationship with each 
other. Knowledge and information, therefore, change through the interaction 
happening in the market. Thanks to such information transmission, errors can be 
discovered, expectations and preferences change, plans need to be revised in the 
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attempt to make them more mutually consistent. It is important, thus, to observe the 
existence of limited information and to look at the market as the place in which such 
limited information can become less limited, moving the actors to a higher consistency 
between their relative plans. 
Consumers, entrepreneur-producers and resource owners are the players in the 
market; the latter, in turn, is where their interacting decisions, during any period of 
time, take place. Every player has his own content of (limited) knowledge, tastes and 
expectations. Depending on their knowledge, tastes and expectations, the players set 
up their action decisions, or plans. Since, in order to carry out their plans, individuals 
need to interact, it is only through interaction and in time that content of information 
will be modified and eventually a revision of decisions can happen. 
 
During the given period of time, exposure to the decisions of others communicates some of the 
information these decision-makers originally lacked. If they find that their plans cannot be carried 
out, this teaches them that their anticipations concerning the decisions of others were overly 
optimistic. Or they may learn that their undue pessimism has caused them to pass up attractive 
market opportunities. This newly acquired information concerning the plans of others can be 
expected to generate, for the succeeding period of time, a revised set of decisions84.  
 
Market process is then built up by «this series of systematic changes in the 
interconnected network of market decisions». Therefore, and this is the central point, 
it is not possible to conceive a market process in the realm of perfect knowledge. The 
process arises precisely because of the initial ignorance of market participants and the 
natural uncertainty of human action. And the process can only happen during the 
flow of real time. With no market ignorance and no review of plans, there is no process 
at all. Since from one period of market ignorance to the next one, ignorance has been 
somewhat reduced, market participants realize that not only should they implement 
more attractive opportunities but also that such attractiveness needs to be judged in 
comparison with the opportunities offered by competitors. When the incentive to offer 
more attractive opportunities stops, the competitive process stops, too85. 
To conceive economic action in this way means that all subjects, in a way, perform 
entrepreneurial actions. Having defined the objectives, the means for achieving them 
must be chosen in a process that unfolds over time. The attainment of certain 
objectives naturally involves costs, arising from the subjective perception of 
renouncing the attainment of other goals. The expectation is that the subjective benefit 
obtained on attaining the objective is higher than cost/sacrifice. The concept of 
entrepreneurial profit lies in this difference. This does not mean that losses may not 
be incurred or entrepreneurial errors be made. That is, over time, entrepreneurs may 
                                                          
84 Kirzner (1973), p. 10. 
85 See Ferlito (2014a). 
17 | P a g e  
 
realise that errors were made in the choice of means and purposes and that these 
entrepreneurial activities must therefore be reviewed. This is possible precisely 
because, through the free exercise of human action, discovering errors increases the 
heritage of information. The nature of economic calculation lies in this comparison 
between entrepreneurial gains and losses. In a market regime, such assessments are 
possible because subjective assessments, in terms of income and sacrifice, are 
transformed into objective values through the price mechanism. It precisely mirrors 
the subjective meeting of subjective assessments that, in meeting, generate objectively 
weighted and quantifiable assessments. 
Such definition of human action and entrepreneurship is flanked by a 
corresponding idea of socialism, as we noticed before. If the socialist perspective 
would be technically possible, it would be possible, in its realm, to experience a 
rational calculation as the one happening for the individual planning; rational 
calculation means the possibility to compare costs and revenues expressed in objective 
prices. This means that it would be possible for a central planner to gather all the data 
needed to produce a perfect rational economic calculation. In this way, the central 
authority, after collecting the necessary information from the minds of individuals, 
provides all the new information to the players, in terms of prices, the goods to 
produce, how many, etc... 
Two main objections can be raised. Firstly, the type of information that each subject 
possesses, of an exclusive character, is by nature tacit and cannot be articulated. This 
means that it is «logically impossible for this information to be transmitted to the 
governing body»86. In fact, the problem is not merely quantitative; it does not simply 
involves an enormous amount of data but also the dispersion of such information 
among individuals, as well as of its being impossible to transmit it to any planning 
organ. This argument, which we could define as static, can be flanked by a dynamic 
argument, which can be summarised as follows: the information available to 
individuals is not given once and for all; rather, it is continuously modified, so that – 
in a dynamic process taking place in real time – expectations and plans change with 
it. 
It is clear, then, that in a socialist system, the mediator role played by the price 
system is absent. Since there are no subjective evaluations, because everything is 
determined by the central authorities, prices cannot exist. As we noticed before, prices 
are the objective synthesis of subjective evaluations exchanged in the market. Without 
the market, such a synthesis function cannot happen and prices cannot arise. 
Calculation is impossible. 
As a result, we realised how the nature of the problem does not consist in one or 
another system of equations to be solved but, rather, in understanding how human 
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action and related knowledge actually take part in the market process. Even if a central 
planning body had a certain amount of information at disposal, judged good enough 
to determine a plan, the fundamental problem is that, once the plan is notified to the 
individuals, during its implementation the information resumes its dynamic process 
of change, thereby making the data used to define the plan already ‘old’. Yet this does 
not mean say that no plans exist in economic action. Quite the opposite. Plans are 
continually implemented by individuals in an effort to attain their objectives. And we 
must not conclude that the knowledge available to individuals is perfect, given and 
unchangeable. On the contrary, it is constantly changing. However, in the process of 
interaction between individuals, the dynamic process of acquiring information can 
take place over time and allow plans to change accordingly, in the ceaseless search for 
mutual coordination, thanks to the information transmission operated by prices. In a 
more or less planned system, however, it is assumed that data remain unchanged for 
a period of time that is long enough to allow the plan to be implemented; this 
assumption, by evidently distorting reality, contains the core for the failure of every 
planning experiment87. 
Such argument, however, seems not to be understood nor by politicians neither by 
economists. The fact is witnessed by the massive government intervention developed 
in the East and in the West after World War II. 
 
For more than half a century, the belief that deliberate regulation of all social affairs must 
necessarily be more successful than the apparent haphazard interplay of independent individuals 
has continuously gained ground until to-day there is hardly a political group anywhere in the 
world which does not want central direction of most human activities in the service of one aim or 
another88. 
 
Economists are especially guilty for being not able to understand the objections to 
central planning, resting « on the impossibility within a socialist system of generating 
the practical information in the form of market prices, that is necessary for the 
intellectual division of knowledge which a modern society requires and which only 
arises from the creative capacity of human action or entrepreneurship»89. 
 
The main reason why we cannot hope to achieve efficiency, through centralised management, in 
the use of resources not even remotely comparable to what is made possible by the market is that the 
economic order of all large societies is based on the use of special circumstantial knowledge spread 
among thousands or millions of individuals90.  
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Central planning, therefore, by preventing the exercise of entrepreneurial 
functions, even if only limited to the main capital assets and natural resources, does 
not allow the creation and transmission of the practical information needed to form of 
a price system, a necessary aspect for every rational economic calculation. It is clear 
that the problem cannot be circumvented by an arbitrary system of prices defined by 
a central authority based on premises more or less extraneous to reality. Every socialist 
economic decision takes place in total and utter ignorance of economic processes and 
without the basis for rational economic calculation. 
After decades of socialist experiments, we can easily conclude that the  
 
most important theoretical knowledge gained from a basic analysis of the effects of price 
controls is this: the effect of intervention is the very opposite of what it was meant to achieve. If 
government is to avoid the undesirable consequences, it cannot stop with just market interference. 
Step by step it must continue until it finally seizes control over production from the entrepreneurs 
and capitalists91. 
 
How is it possible for politicians and, in particular, for economists to have indulged 
for so long on such a big mistake? Hayek ([1974] 2008, p. 30) associates the persistent 
errors of economists with «their propensity to imitate as closely as possible the 
procedures of the brilliantly successful physical sciences». Economists, with the 
pretext of being ‘scientists, imitate the methods of the natural sciences but in doing so 
apply an inappropriate method to the study of human sciences, giving birth to utterly 
unscientific theories, since the method is not imposed by the object studied in 
accordance with to the Aristotelian tradition but by the ideological preconceptions of 
the scholars themselves.  
In complex phenomena, fundamental data are often not measurable. If our analysis 
were to refer only to measurable entities, we would be obliged to restrict the field of 
investigation to a great extent. It is consequently the case today in our science that 
those who believe they have a truly scientific approach because they do nothing other 
than correlate and correlate series and series of data in the search for functional 
relationships, actually produce theories which are extremely limited and most 
unlikely to say anything useful about reality.  
Consequently, ignorance of true economic science and the presumption that 
science can only be based on measurable quantities has culminated in producing 
massive damage in the real world. The presumption of providing exact requirements 
in time and space, of being able to determine the level of employment exactly starting 
from planned fixing of aggregate demand, has created a «very extensive misallocation 
of resources which is likely to make later large-scale unemployment inevitable»92. 
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Unluckily, economic theory is merely a pretext and used to determine even more 
social control, with the excuse of thinking higher interests or a notorious common 
good. Yet the 
 
welfare of a people, like the happiness of a man, depends on a great many things that can be 
provided in an infinite variety of combinations. It cannot be adequately expressed as a single end, 
but only as a hierarchy of ends, a comprehensive scale of values in which every need of every 
person is given its place. To direct all our activities according to a single plan presupposes that 
every one of our needs is given its rank in an order of values which must be complete enough to 
make it possible to decide between all the different courses between which the planner has to 
choose. It presupposes, in short, the existence of a complete ethical code in which all the different 
human values are allotted their due place93. 
 
Yet the problem is that such a comprehensive code of ethics able to organise society 
in hierarchical terms in accordance with a precise scale of purposes and values, cannot 
exist and be defined. In particular, cannot be defined by way of imposition. The State 
as an organisation cannot allow itself to identify such a code of ethics. 
As we have seen so far, serious analysis of planning cannot but lead to the 
conclusion that, in order to be implemented, it has to be conducted through more or 
less accentuated forms of dictatorship. The freedom that planners promise is nothing 
more than freedom from the responsibility of deciding for oneself, freedom from 
action and from decisions with all the weight of personal responsibility that it entails. 
The desire for presumed equality and an easy life can destroy the longing for liberty, 
because true freedom always implies responsibility.  
A society can only grow, on the contrary, through free individual action. 
Economists should be servants of that principle and not slaves of artificial systems of 
ideas, which often become the justification for erroneous policies, ‘scientists’ whose 
only goal is to restrict freedom by ever increasing degrees. The main point for a social 
scientist is to acknowledge that planning cannot be implemented, unless the intended 
goal is collective suffering. 
 
The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student 
of society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming an accomplice in men’s 
fatal striving to control society – a striving which makes him not only a tyrant over his fellows, but 
which may well make him the destroyer of a civilization which no brain has designed but which 
has grown from the free efforts of millions of individuals94.  
 
 
VI. SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
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So far we have seen how Malaysian government succeeded in creating a national 
car brand, thanks to heavy protectionist and supportive policy. However, results are 
below expectations. It is true that Proton and Perodua dominate the local market in 
terms of production, but Malaysia remains a net importer of vehicles. Moreover, the 
great financial effort to support the national automotive industry stopped the local 
technological development because of the lack of competition. In the same time, it 
increased the public debt and forced consumers in purchasing cars at a higher price 
than the market level. Finally, together with NEP, NCP and NAP missed the sight to 
create a strong group of bumiputera entrepreneurs. 
The core of our thesis is not only that industrial protection policies damage the 
economic system, but also that such a failure is to be expected, because of the technical 
impossibility of rational economic calculation under every kind of central plan. Which 
direction should be taken, then? Someone argues that it would be good enough to link 
Proton (and eventually other national companies) with a big and important 
international partner95. To reason in this way means to miss completely the point. We 
agree with Dr Mahathir when he stresses that developing countries remain colonies if 
they need to import technology and they are not able to develop a national system of 
innovation96. And his attempt, under this perspective, is remarkable. However, the 
action focus should be shift from a direct intervention toward an educational one. 
How to enhance innovation processes development? 
We believe we should look at the educational system. At the very first, it could 
seem that a strong scientific education, like the one developed in the Asian context, 
should be a good engine for an innovative mind set development. We do not agree 
with such perspective. Engineering, in the way in which it is often taught, does not 
stimulate creativity and innovation. On the contrary, it simply transfers technical 
notions to be applied to practical issue. This is the worst approach to creativity, 
because it teaches simply how to apply given technics to limited problems.  
It is a humanistic approach, instead, which can shape a different mentality. 
Philosophy, literature, poetry, history: these are the disciplines who can help young 
eager minds to question about everything, not to simply accept given solutions. 
Everybody can potentially apply a given solution to a specific problem. Innovators, 
on the contrary, are not happy with given solutions. What is needed is developing 
curiosity and questioning attitude.  
This could be a first step, for developing nations like Malaysia, to try to shift from 
‘importing technology’ to ‘generate innovation’: curiosity and questioning attitude, 
forged by an educational system which stimulates debates and minds interaction. 
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Such an educational system is centred on philosophy and history rather than 
engineering.  
Such a solution will not answer to our original question. But maybe it could help 
to shape the future in a different way97. 
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